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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

JOSEPH VAUGHN MAYNE,
I

)

Petitioner-Appellant,
v.

JOHN W. TURNER, Warden,

State Prison,
Respondent-Appel lee

Utah

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JOSEPH VAUGHN MAYNE
STATEMENT OF CASE
This action is a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, directed at two separate conVictj_ons, by petitioner, Joseph Vaughn Mayne.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court, after an evidentiary
henrjng, entered judgment denying the petition
for

hnbens corpus.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Petitioner, Joseph Vaughn Mayne seeks
reversal of the judgment denying his petition
for habeas corpus as to each conviction.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 20, 1960, a complaint was lodged
petitioner, Joseph Vaughn Mayne (Comp.
Case No. 1 7001), who was then 1 7 years of age
(Tr. 4).

The complaint bears an endorsement,

'in the form of a rubber stamp, signed by the

judge, to the effect that there appears to be
!probable cause to believe that a crime was comI

I

I

by the petitioner, and ordering that he

!he held to answer the complaint.

Aside from

I

:this rubber stamp endorsement, the record in
I

Jcase 17001 is La rren of any indication that any
judge considered, at the time the petitioner
bound over to the District Court for trial,
I

i
'

his best interests would be served by a

,trial in the District Court or in the juvenile

3

court or whether the interests of the state
in the case required trial of the matter in
the District Court.

The petitioner was arraigned

in the District Court on July 11, 1960 (Informa-

tion Case No. 17001) and pled not guilty.

He

represented at this time by counsel,
Benjamin Spence, Esquire.

On the 15lli of July,

1960, the petitioner changed his pl ea to guilty

(Tr. 11).

On August 1, 1960, the petitioner

sentenced to confinement in the Utah State
Prison for the indeterminate term prescribed

;for the crime of issuing a fictitious check,
iI
1

(Commi tment Case No. 17001).

The petitioner

granted probation and a stay of execution

i

iof this sentence.

On September 11, 1961, the

petitioner's probation was revoked and the
Peti tioner was committed to the Utah State

1

I

Ip .

I

r1son to serve his sentence.

The petitioner

neither present nor represented by counsel

at the hearing on September 11, 1961, at which
his probation was revoked.

He was given no

4

opportunity to cross-examine any witnesses
may have testified at that hearing and

he was given no written indication of the
rerisons for which the probation was revoked.
On July 10, 1961, a complaint was lodged
against petitioner charging him with the crimes
of robbery and grand larceny,

(Comp. Case No.

On July 25, 1961, the petitioner was

17533).

arraigned on these charges before Judge Ray
Van Cott, Jr.

The petitioner, who was then

18 yeurs of age, appeared without counsel,

(Tr. 5).

The petitioner talked with a Salt

Lake City detective prior to his arraignment.
detective suggested to the petitioner that
plead guilty and the petitioner agreed pro'viding he would get probation for the convictlon, (Tr. 20).

The detective then left the

room and returned, saying that he had talked

·to the District Attorney and arranged the
and probation would be granted to
ipetitioner, (Tr. 20).

At the time of his

5
1rraignment, al though the commitment recites
the petitioner waived appointment of
wunsel, (Commitment Case 17533) the court

hd not inform the petitioner that he was
mtitled to have an attorney appointed to
him at the expense of the state, (Tr. 6).
fue judge also failed to inform the petitioner
of his right to confront the witnesses against
him and to cross-examine them and his right to

a jury trial, (Tr. 7).

Nor did the judge tell

.llie petitioner that the entrance of a guilty
;plea was in effect self-incrimination and that
1he had a constitutional right not to incrimin-

late himself, (Tr. 7).

I
I

Based upon his guilty

!plea, the petitioner was sentenced to the in1

!determinate term for robbery and grand larceny
and committed to prison August 1, 1961,
:(Commitment Case 17533).

Both the judge who

sentenced petitioner in Case 17533 and the
reporter who recorded the commitment hearing

are now deceased, (Aff. of Deputy Clerk) and
the shorthand notes of the commitment hearing

cannot be found,

(Aff. of Deputy Clerk).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SENTENCE IN CASE 17001 IS
ILLEGAL AND VOID.
A.

The trial court erred in finding

that § 55-10-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953)
not unconstitutional as a denial of due
.rocess and equal protection of the laws as
paranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to
ithe Constitution of the .United States.

Under the Juvenile Court Act as it
at the time 6f the trial in Case No.
117001 both the juvenile court and the district
I

loourt had concurrent jurisdiction over the

I

trial of juveniles charged with felonies.
Section 55-10-5(2) Utah Code Annotated 1953.
\1'hen a juvenile was tried before the juvenile

court, the proceeding was informal and
in nature rather than criminal.
Section 55-10-26 Utah Code Annotated 1953.
judgment resulting from a conviction in the

7

juvenile court was not imprisonment but probation, commitment to the state industrial
school, res ti tut ion for the injured party or
some other remedy.

Annotated 1953.

Section 55-10-30 Utah Code

However, where a juvenile was

tried in the district court the proceedings
were criminal in nature and a conviction re-

,sulted in a sentence of imprisonment.

Thus,

fuere was substantial difference between trial

1

in the juvenile court and trial in the district

1

I

'

court with regard to the possible outcome of

I,

1llie case and its effect on the defendant.
!

Des-

\pitc this difference in the procedure of the
I

!two courts the choice of courts rested with

\the prosecutor since in his discretion he
could bring a case in either court.

The fact

i

1tlrnt the prosecutor had such discretion might
I

inot have resulted in discriminatory treatment
'1

of a defendant if the procedure in both courts

tdlled for a determination based upon a

i

standard of whether the trial of a

8

lefendccmt should take place in that court.
this was not the case.

If a proceeding

originated in the juvenile court if was transfcrred only if the interests of the state
transfer, while if the case originated
in the district court it was transferred only
if the interests of the defendant required

transfer.

Thus, a case brought in the juvenile

court \vould remain there regardless of whether
1

0r not the interests of the juvenile required

it, unless the interests of the state required
trial by the district court.

However, a case

brought in the district court could not be
transferred to the juvenile court unless the
district court found that the interests of the
defendant required transfer.

This emphasis

, on the interest of the juvenile in one case
the same interest is irrelevant in other
cases results in an arbitrary and invidious
discrimination between parties who would be
!
I

identically situated but for the whim of the

9
i

I

Iprosecutor.

:

Under Pace v. Alabama, 106 US

583 (1883) such treatment, which may result
I

:in inflicting upon one individual greater or
'

different punishment than that inflicted on
another similarly situated is a violation of
the equal protection and due process clauses

J

I
!

of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Cons ti tu-

1

:tion of the United States.

It was, therefore,

error for the trial court to find that § 55-10-5
constitutional.
B.

The trial court erred in finding

that the District Judge, sitting as a commit-

1-

ting mogistrate in Case 17001, properly con-

sidered the welfare of the petitioner when he
bound over to be tried as an adult pursutnnt to § 55-10-5 Utah Code Annotated.
The record is barren of any indication
'that the trial judge in Case 17001 considered
the welfare of the petitioner before determining
to bind the petitioner over for trial
in the district court.

.1..V

As discussed in paragraph A above,
fuere is a substantial difference in the
:procedures and results of trial in the juvenile
'court and the district court.
I

Section 55-10-5

(5) Utah Code Annotated 1953 provided that when
I

a juvenile was charged with the commission of

[a felony before the district court the court
I
1

!

sat as a committing magistrate and either bound

I

\ilie defendant over for trial before the district

Icourt
I

or, if in the court's judgment the
would be harmful to the best

linteres ts of the juvenile, transferred the
to the juvenile court.

This determination

is clearly a stage of the proceedings at which
mbstantial rights and consequences to the
depend upon a decision by the court.
cases have held that a defendant is
entitled to counsel, and a fortiori to a strict
adherence to constitutional due process, at

Wery critical stage of the proceedings.
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 US 129 (1967),

See

11
I

v. Cochran, 369 US 506 (1962).

Never-

Weless, there is no indication in the record

1

•

•

I

No. 17001 that the district judge con1.

fs1tlered whether a prosecution in the district

icourt would be harmful to the best interests
for

the petitioner, who was then a juvenile.

ln1e fact that the judge did not consider this

I

I

and make a finding with regard to it
is a clear denial of due process to the defenaant.

In a similar case, Kent v. United States,

IB3 US 541 (1966) the United States Supreme
has held that an express determination
the interests of the juvenile is
required.
It is submitted that the failure of the
trial judge in Case No. 17001 to make a determination with regard to the interests of the
Jwenile resulted in an unconstitutional denial
of due process of law and voids the conviction

there.

I
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POINT II
TIIE SENTENCE IN CASE 17533 IS

ILLEGAL AND VOID.
A.

illiat

The trial court erred in finding

the petitioner knowingly and intelligently

\waived his right to hnve counsel appointed to

jassist in his defense.
1

At the time the court accepted the peti-

1

I

tioner' s guilty plea in Case 17533 the
petitioner was 18 years of age.

lalOlli grade

He had only

The commitment recites

in summary form "defendant waives appointment

of counsel".

It is a well established pro-

of federal constitutional law that
courts will indulge every reasonable presumption
against a waiver of fundamental constitutional
rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458 (1938).
And that "while an accused may waive the right

lo counsel, whether there is a proper waiver
should be clearly determined by the trial
and it would be fitting and appropriate
for that determination to appear upon the

J_ t_)

',record " • J ohnson v. Zerbst, supra.

It is

further well established th<tt where a person
not intelligently and understandingly
the benefit of counsel then the due
process clause of the federal constitution
iwalidates his conviction Moore v. Michigan,
!355 US 155 (1957).

In the present case it

that no transcript of the proceedings
in the trial court is available due to a loss
of the records of the case by the clerk's
office.

Thus, the only support appearing

in the record for the proposition that the
defendant waived appointment of counsel is a
conclusory statement in the commitment to this
effect.

The federal courts have held that

"presuming waiver from a silent
record is impermissible. The
record must show, or there must
be an Rllegation in evidence which
show, that an accused was offered
counsel but intelligently and
underst<tndingly rejected-the offer.
Anything less is not a waiver."
[emph added]
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Carnley v. Cochran, 369 US 506 (1962).
It has been held in numerous federal cases
iliat a defendant must not merely be informed

I

/or his right to counsel but must be informed
if he cannot afford counsel then counsel
. will be appointed for him at no expense to him.

I

the instant case, petitioner was told by
the judge that he had a right to counsel.

petitioner was not told by the trial
judge that he had a right to have counsel
appointed for him at the expense of the state

I if

he could not afford counsel.

Since petitioner

believed that he would have to pay for counsel,
did not knowingly and intelligently waive

!his right to counsel.

The following cases sup-

'
\port
the proposition that the defendant is

I
I

.entitled to be told that counsel will be
appointed for him without expense to him if he
cannot afford counsel:
11

Re Gault, 387 US 1 (1967)

lf they were unab 1 e t o a ff or d t o emp 1 oy

counsel, they were entitled in view of the

L

seriousness of the charge and the potential
commitment, to appointed counsel unless they
ci1osc waiver.

Mrs. Gault's knowledge that she

could employ counsel was not an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a fully known
' ri<ht."

Wright v. Dickson, 336 F. 2d 878 (91b

Ci ... 1964).
11

ti,1

Recitation in the record that

court informs the defendants of their

rights to counsel at all stages of the proci:cdii-1:_,s against them.

The defendants' waive

th8 right to an attorney and are willing to

proceed at this time" held to be insufficient

to sho\\ knowin[., 0nd intentional waiver.

Right

to retain counsel was revealed but right to
8ppojnted counsel was not revealed.
'v, Cox, 350 F.2d 909 (l01b Cir. 1965).

Shawan
Waiver

not shown from question by court to accused as

to whether he wanted a lawyer.

I

Meadows v.

e 11 , 3 71 F. 2d 6 6 4 ( 6 tb Cir. 19 6 7 ) •

Waiver

I

not shown from recitation in court order that
defendant had been informed of his constitutional

rights.

United Stat es v. Russell, 388 F. 2d

21 (3rd Cir. 1968).

Waiver not shown from

recitation that counsel would be appointed
without indication that counsel would be paid
for by the state.
B.

The trial court erred in finding

that the petitioner knowingly and intelligently
entered a plea of guilty.
The petitioner did not knowingly and
intelligently enter a plea of guilty to the
charge in Case 17533 but rather such plea was
improvident and secured by coercion and
frickcry and resulted in a denial to the petitioner of due process of law and equal protection of the laws as guaranteed for the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.

Officers of the Salt Lake County

Sheriff's office or Salt Lake City Police
Department told the petitioner that if he would
enter a plea of guilty to the charge in Case
17533 the matter could be consolidated with
Cuse 17001 and he would be admitted to probation

17

on the charge in Case 17533.

The petitioner,

due to his lack of education, and his ignorance

of criminal law and procedure believed that
he could rely on promises made by these
police officers and was thereby induced to
enter a plea of guilty to the charge.

Since

the defendant was induced by false promises
to enter a guilty plea, his plea could not

have been voluntary and the conviction based
on the plea is thus invalid.

Marino v. Ragen,

332 US 561 (1947), Moore v. Michigan, 355 US

155 (1957).
CONCLUSION
The petitioner submits that because
§ 55-10-5 Utah Code Annotated 1953 arbitrarilly

discrimates between defendants who happen to be
charged in the district court and those who happen to be charged in the juvenile court, it unconstitutionally denies both the equal protection of the law and due process of law which are
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the

lO

Constitution of the United States.

Should

this court, however, find that § 55-10-5 is
not unconstitutional, the petitioner submits
that this section was unconstitutionally applied
in Case 17001 because the district judge failed
to make a finding concerning the court in which
the matter should be tried.

For these reasons,

the petitioner submits that the conviction and
sentence in Case 17001 are illegal and void and
that his petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in that case should be granted.
The petitioner submits that he did not
knowingly and intelligently waive his right to
counsel in Case 17533 and that he did not
knowingly and intelligently enter a plea in

thRt case.

For this reason, the petitioner

submits that the conviction and sentence in
Case 17533 is illegal and void and that a
Writ of habeas corpus should issue relieving
the petitioner of said sentence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
James G. Pattillo
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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